Право
Навигация

 

Реклама




 

 

Ресурсы в тему

 

Реклама

Секс все чаще заменяет квартплату

Новости законодательства Беларуси

 

СНГ Бизнес - Деловой Портал. Каталог. Новости

 

Рейтинг@Mail.ru


Законодательство Российской Федерации

Архив (обновление)

 

 

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 24.11.2005 ДЕЛО ШОФМАН (SHOFMAN) ПРОТИВ РОССИИ [АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

<<< Назад

                                
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
                             FIRST SECTION
                                   
                       CASE OF SHOFMAN v. RUSSIA
                      (Application No. 74826/01)
                                   
                             JUDGMENT <*>
                                   
                       (Strasbourg, 24.XI.2005)
                                   
   --------------------------------
       <*>  This  judgment will become final in the circumstances  set
   out  in  Article  44 з 2 of the Convention. It may  be  subject  to
   editorial revision.
   
       In the case of Shofman v. Russia,
       The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting  as
   a Chamber composed of:
       Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
       Mrs F. Tulkens,
       Mr P. Lorenzen,
       Mrs {N. Vajic} <*>,
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Mrs S. Botoucharova,
       Mr A. Kovler,
       Mr S.E. Jebens, judges,
       and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
       Having deliberated in private on 3 November 2005,
       Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
   mentioned date:
                                   
                               PROCEDURE
                                   
       1. The case originated in an application (No. 74826/01) against
   the  Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article  34  of
   the  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and  Fundamental
   Freedoms  ("the Convention") by Mr Leonid Mikhaylovich Shofman,  on
   5  September 2001. The applicant was a Russian national at the time
   of  the  events  complained  of;  he subsequently  obtained  German
   nationality.
       2.   The  applicant,  who  had  been  granted  legal  aid,  was
   represented before the Court by Mr G. Rixe, a lawyer practising  in
   Bielefeld, Germany. The Russian Government ("the Government")  were
   represented  by  their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, Representative  of  the
   Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
       3. The applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of Article
   8  of  the Convention, in that proceedings to disclaim his presumed
   paternity  were held to be time-barred under the law  in  force  at
   the material time.
       4.  The  application was allocated to the First Section of  the
   Court  (Rule  52 з 1 of the Rules of Court). Within  that  Section,
   the  Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 з  1  of  the
   Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 з 1.
       5.  By  a  decision  of 25 March 2004, the Court  declared  the
   application partly admissible.
       6.  Neither the applicant nor the Government filed observations
   on the merits (Rule 59 з 1).
       7.  On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its
   Sections  (Rule  25  з  1). This case was  assigned  to  the  newly
   composed First Section (Rule 52 з 1).
                                   
                               THE FACTS
                                   
                   I. The circumstances of the case
                                   
       8.  The  applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Gross-Rohrheim
   (Germany).
       9. On 10 August 1989 the applicant registered his marriage with
   Ms  G.  in  Novosibirsk.  After the  marriage  they  moved  to  St.
   Petersburg.
       10.  On  12 May 1995, during her stay at her parents'  home  in
   Novosibirsk,  Ms  G.  gave birth to a son  to  whom  she  gave  her
   surname,  despite objections from the applicant. Shortly thereafter
   the  birth  was registered; the applicant was named as the  child's
   father in the register.
       11.  In  late September 1995 Ms G. and her son returned to  St.
   Petersburg.  The  applicant believed that he was the  boy's  father
   and treated him as his own.
       12.  On  28  March 1996 the applicant moved to  Germany.  Until
   September  1997 he waited for Ms G. and the son to join him  there.
   However,  in  a letter of September 1997, Ms G. informed  him  that
   she  had  no plans to continue their marriage and would be applying
   for  maintenance for the child. At about that time the  applicant's
   relatives  in  Novosibirsk advised him that he was  not  the  boy's
   father.
       13.  On  16 December 1997 the applicant petitioned for  divorce
   and  brought an action contesting paternity. On 12 April  1999  the
   divorce was granted.
       14. On 16 November 2000 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of
   Novosibirsk  delivered judgment in the paternity action.  It  noted
   that  genetic  (DNA)  tests  of  28  June  1999  and  5  June  2000
   demonstrated  that  the applicant could not be  the  boy's  father.
   Although  Ms  G. maintained that the applicant was the  father,  in
   the  absence  of  any doubts as to the accuracy of the  tests,  the
   court  established  that the applicant was not the  father  of  her
   son.
       The  District Court ruled, however, that the case was  governed
   by  the  RSFSR <*> Marriage and Family Code of 30 July 1969 because
   the  child had been born before 1 March 1996, that is to say before
   the  new  Family Code of the Russian Federation came  into  effect.
   The  RSFSR  Marriage  and  Family Code set  a  one-year  limitation
   period  for an action contesting paternity, the starting  point  of
   which  was  calculated  from  the  date  the  putative  father  was
   informed  that  he  had  been registered  as  the  father.  As  the
   applicant had not contested paternity when the child was  born  and
   had  only applied to the courts in December 1997, after the  expiry
   of  the time-limit, his action was held to be time-barred. The fact
   that  a new Family Code had been introduced which did not lay  down
   a  limitation  period for paternity actions was irrelevant  because
   it  was  only  applicable to family-law disputes  arising  after  1
   March 1996.
   --------------------------------
       <*> RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federalist Socialist Republic.
   
       15.  On  15  March  2001, on an appeal by  the  applicant,  the
   Novosibirsk  Regional  Court upheld the  judgment  of  16  November
   2000.
       16.  On  20 April and 26 October 2001 the Novosibirsk  Regional
   Court   and   the   Supreme  Court  of  the   Russian   Federation,
   respectively,  refused  requests by the applicant  for  supervisory
   review.
       17.  On 12 September 2002 the Justice of the Peace of the Third
   Court  Circuit  of  the Zheleznodorozhniy District  of  Novosibirsk
   granted  Ms  G.'s claim for maintenance and made a  charging  order
   over the applicant's interest in a flat.
       18.  On 15 September 2003 the Zheleznodorozhniy District  Court
   of Novosibirsk upheld the maintenance order.
                                   
                       II. Relevant domestic law
                                   
       19.  The RSFSR Marriage and Family Code of 30 July 1969 (Кодекс
   РСФСР  о браке и семье) provided that a person entered in the birth
   register  as  the father of a child could contest the entry  within
   one  year  of the date he became or should have become  aware  that
   the entry had been made (Article 49).
       20.  The  Family Code of the Russian Federation of 29  December
   1995  (Семейный  кодекс РФ, in force from 1  March  1996)  provides
   that  a  person entered in the birth register as the  father  of  a
   child  may  contest  the  entry by means  of  judicial  proceedings
   (Article  52  з 1). It does not set any time-limit for bringing  an
   action.
       21.  Resolution  No.  9  of the Plenary Supreme  Court  of  the
   Russian Federation of 25 October 1996 "On application by courts  of
   the  Family  Code of the Russian Federation to the cases concerning
   paternity   and  maintenance"  established  that,  in  respect   of
   children  born before 1 March 1996, the RSFSR Marriage  and  Family
   Code   was   applicable  and,  accordingly,  the   time-limit   for
   contesting  paternity was one year from the date the person  became
   or  should  have  become aware of his registration as  the  child's
   parent.
                                   
                                THE LAW
                                   
          I. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention
                                   
       22.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention
   that  he had been prevented from instituting proceedings to contest
   paternity  by  the fact that, for statute-of-limitations  purposes,
   time  had  started to run from the date the birth  was  registered.
   Article 8 reads as follows:
       "1.  Everyone  has  the right to respect for  his  private  and
   family life, his home and his correspondence.
       2.  There  shall be no interference by a public authority  with
   the  exercise  of  this right except such as is in accordance  with
   the  law  and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
   of  national security, public safety or the economic well-being  of
   the  country,  for  the prevention of disorder or  crime,  for  the
   protection  of  health  or morals, or for  the  protection  of  the
   rights and freedoms of others."
                                   
                      A. Arguments by the parties
                                   
                           1. The applicant
                                   
       23.  The  applicant submitted, firstly, that  even  though  the
   paternity  proceedings  had  been  aimed  at  the  dissolution   of
   existing  family  ties, the determination of  his  legal  relations
   with  his  child undoubtedly concerned his private life  (Rasmussen
   v.  Denmark, judgment of 21 November 1984, Series A No. 87, p.  13,
   з  33).  The  State had a positive obligation under  Article  8  to
   secure  respect  for  private  life  even  in  the  sphere  of  the
   relations  of  individuals  between  themselves  (Botta  v.  Italy,
   judgment  of  24 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and  Decisions
   1998-I,  p.  422,  з 33). In particular, the child  had  the  right
   under  Article 8 to establish a legal relationship with his natural
   father ({Mikulic} v. Croatia, No. 53176/99, зз 64 - 66, ECHR  2002-
   I)  and the husband had the right to contest paternity in order  to
   establish   that  he  was  not  the  biological  father.   In   the
   applicant's opinion, Article 8 guaranteed the right to  dissolve  a
   family  tie  which  was  not the result of a  biological  bond.  He
   concluded  on  the basis of the Kroon judgment that biological  and
   social  reality  should  prevail over legal  presumptions  and  the
   quest for legal certainty of relations, so that any presumption  of
   paternity had to be effectively capable of being rebutted  and  not
   amount  to  a  de facto rule (Kroon and Others v. the  Netherlands,
   judgment  of 27 October 1994, Series A No. 297-C, з 40). The  right
   to  contest  paternity  was  accepted in  all  Contracting  States,
   including the Russian Federation. The applicant contended that  the
   decisions  of the domestic courts to declare his action disclaiming
   paternity  time-barred constituted an interference with  his  right
   to respect for his private and family life.
       24.  The  applicant accepted that the judgments of the domestic
   courts had been based on the law in force at the material time.  He
   stressed,  however,  that  the  Government  had  not  advanced  any
   reasons  to  show that the law in question had pursued a legitimate
   aim  and  that the interference had been necessary in a  democratic
   society.  The  applicant submitted that the  interference  had  not
   been necessary and was not justified for the following reasons.
       25.  For the purposes of the limitation period provided for  in
   the  national  law and applied in the applicant's  case,  time  had
   started  to run irrespective of whether the husband had any  doubts
   concerning  his  biological paternity at  that  juncture.  A  legal
   father  would  only disclaim paternity if he was put on  notice  of
   facts  that  showed that he was not the father.  Only  under  these
   circumstances  could  he  make  an informed  choice  regarding  the
   child:  either  to  disavow it or continue to assume  the  parental
   obligations  under  a  form of legalised adoption.  Therefore,  the
   legislature should have allowed an appropriate period during  which
   the  putative  father  could  make a considered  decision.  In  the
   applicant's   assessment,   his  rights   would   be   sufficiently
   safeguarded  only if time started to run from the date the  husband
   learnt  of the facts suggesting that he might not be the biological
   father.  Furthermore, he contended that such an  arrangement  would
   not  impair  the  interests of the child and  that  it  was  better
   psychologically  for the child's legal paternity to  correspond  to
   the biological reality.
       26. The applicant laid emphasis on the fact that the new Family
   Code  (effective  from 1 March 1996) contained  no  time-limit  for
   contesting paternity. An authoritative legal commentary on the  new
   Family   Code   written  by  a  former  Russian  Justice   Minister
   acknowledged that the position of the legislature reflected in  the
   new  Code  "placed an emphasis on the factual descent of the  child
   as  opposed to the mere formalism of the civil record which impeded
   the  establishment of the truth". In the applicant's opinion,  this
   change  at  the domestic level demonstrated that the  interests  of
   the  child  could  be  safeguarded without  preventing  a  putative
   father from contesting paternity.
       27.  The  applicant  asserted that in  most  other  Contracting
   States  either  the limitation period for contesting paternity  was
   relatively long in countries in which time was calculated from  the
   child's  birth, or time only started to run once the  legal  father
   became  aware  of  facts  showing that he was  not  the  biological
   father. In certain countries there was no time-limit at all or  the
   limitation period was very long.
       28.  Finally, the applicant submitted that by the time  he  had
   discovered  that  he might not be the biological father  the  time-
   limit  had  already expired. There were no interests of  the  child
   that  conflicted  with his right to disclaim paternity  because  he
   had  been  living permanently in Germany since 28  March  1996  and
   there had been no actual family bond between him and the child.
                                   
                           2. The Government
                                   
       29. The Government submitted that the judgments of the domestic
   courts were fully in compliance with the domestic law, notably  the
   RSFSR  Code  of  Marriage and Family, which was applicable  in  the
   applicant's  case.  The  domestic  courts  established   that   the
   applicant  had agreed to his registration as the child's father  in
   July  1995 and, accordingly, could have contested the entry  before
   30  June  1996.  However,  he  had  not  issued  proceedings  until
   December  1997  and his action had therefore been time-barred.  The
   Government concluded that there had been no interference  with  the
   applicant's right to respect for his private and family life.
                                   
                       B. The Court's assessment
                                   
            1. Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention
                                   
       30.  The  Court has already examined cases in which  a  husband
   wished  to  institute proceedings to contest  the  paternity  of  a
   child  born in wedlock. In those cases the question was  left  open
   whether the paternity proceedings aimed at the dissolution  in  law
   of  existing  family ties concerned the applicant's  "family  life"
   because  of  the  finding that, in any event, the determination  of
   the  father's legal relations with his putative child concerned his
   "private  life"  (Yildirim  v. Austria  (dec.),  No.  34308/96,  19
   October 1999; and Rasmussen, cited above, з 33).
       31.  In  the  instant case the applicant sought,  by  means  of
   judicial  proceedings,  to  rebut  the  legal  presumption  of  his
   paternity  on  the  basis of biological evidence.  The  purpose  of
   those  proceedings was to determine his legal relationship with  Ms
   G.'s son, who was registered as his own.
       32. Accordingly, the facts of the case fall within the ambit of
   Article 8.
                                   
                         2. General principles
                                   
       33. The Court reiterates that the essential object of Article 8
   is  to  protect the individual against arbitrary action  by  public
   authorities.   There  may  in  addition  be  positive   obligations
   inherent  in  ensuring effective "respect" for  private  or  family
   life.  These  obligations  may involve  the  adoption  of  measures
   designed  to secure respect for private life even in the sphere  of
   the  relations  of individuals between themselves  (see  {Mikulic},
   cited above, з 57, with further references).
       34.  However,  the boundaries between the State's positive  and
   negative  obligations under this provision do not  lend  themselves
   to  precise  definition. The applicable principles are  nonetheless
   similar.  In  both contexts regard must be had to the fair  balance
   that  has  to  be  struck between the competing  interests  of  the
   individual  and of the community as a whole; and in  both  contexts
   the  State  enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see Keegan  v.
   Ireland,  judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A No. 290, з  49;  Kroon,
   cited above, з 31).
       35.  The  Court  reiterates that its task is not to  substitute
   itself   for  the  competent  domestic  authorities  in  regulating
   paternity  disputes  at the national level, but  rather  to  review
   under  the  Convention  the decisions that those  authorities  have
   taken  in  the  exercise  of  their  power  of  appreciation   (see
   {Mikulic}, cited above, з 59; Hokkanen v. Finland, judgment  of  23
   September  1994, Series A No. 299-A, p. 20, з 55). The  Court  will
   therefore  examine whether the respondent State,  in  handling  the
   applicant's  paternity  action,  has  complied  with  its  positive
   obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.
                                   
            3. Compliance with Article 8 of the Convention
                                   
       36.  The  applicant does not dispute that the domestic  courts'
   decisions were "in accordance with the law", notably Article 49  of
   the  RSFSR  Marriage  and Family Code, which  applied  to  disputes
   involving  children  born during the period it  was  in  force.  It
   provided  a  right to contest paternity within one year only  after
   the  husband  learnt or should have learnt of the  registration  of
   the   birth.  Time  began  to  run  under  the  limitation   period
   irrespective  of  whether or not the husband had any  doubts  about
   his biological paternity.
       37.  A  comparative  examination  of  the  Contracting  States'
   legislation  on the institution of paternity actions  reveals  that
   there   is  no  universally  adopted  standard.  With  the  notable
   exception  of  the  small number of States that have  no  statutory
   time-limit   for  bringing  proceedings  contesting  paternity,   a
   limitation period exists which is usually of six months or a  year,
   but may be as long as two years.
       38.  However, the difference between the various legal  systems
   that is relevant to the present case is not only the length of  the
   limitation period as such, but also its dies a quo. In some  States
   the  period is calculated from the moment the putative father  knew
   or  should  have known that he had been registered as  the  child's
   father.  The other States, which are approximately equal in number,
   accept  as  the  starting point the date he learnt or  should  have
   learnt  of  circumstances casting doubt on the child's  legitimacy.
   Many  States in the latter category have introduced a second  time-
   limit,  making  it  possible to disclaim paternity  only  when  the
   child  is  still young. A few States in which time  starts  to  run
   from  the child's birth, irrespective of the father's awareness  of
   any other facts, also fall into the latter category.
       39. The Court has previously accepted that the introduction  of
   a  time-limit  for  the  institution of paternity  proceedings  was
   justified  by  the  desire  to ensure  legal  certainty  in  family
   relations  and  to  protect the interests of the child  (Rasmussen,
   cited  above, з 41). In the Yildirim decision it found  that  "once
   the  limitation  period for the applicant's own  claim  to  contest
   paternity  had  expired, greater weight was given to the  interests
   of  the  child  than to the applicant's interest in disproving  his
   paternity" (cited above). However, this finding was made  in  cases
   where  the  applicant had known with certainty, or had had  grounds
   for  assuming, that he was not the father from the first day of the
   child's  life  but - for reasons unconnected with  the  law  -  had
   taken  no  steps  to contest paternity within the  statutory  time-
   limit (see Yildirim, cited above; Rasmussen, cited above, зз 8  and
   10).
       40.  The situation in the present case was, however, different.
   It  appears  that  for some two years after the child's  birth  the
   applicant  did  not suspect that the child was not his  and  reared
   him  as his own. He was apprised of circumstances casting doubt  on
   his  paternity in September 1997, by which time the statutory time-
   limit  had  already expired. Once the applicant became  aware  that
   the  biological  reality might be different,  he  brought  a  legal
   action   without  delay.  Within  three  months  of  the   relevant
   information  being brought to his attention, he  filed  a  petition
   for divorce and brought an action contesting paternity.
       41. The Court notes that the District Court acknowledged on the
   basis  of  genetic evidence that the applicant was not the  child's
   father  (see paragraph 14 above). It was not therefore the  absence
   of  an  established  biological fact that  caused  the  applicant's
   paternity  action  to  fail (see, in contrast,  Nylund  v.  Finland
   (dec.),  No.  27110/95,  29 June 1999, where  the  domestic  courts
   rejected  the applicant's claim seeking a determination on  whether
   a  biological bond existed between him and the child).  Indeed,  it
   was  common  ground  between the parties that the  applicant  would
   have  had  a right under domestic law to contest the paternity  had
   he  lodged the action within one year after the registration of the
   birth.
       42.  The  Court notes that the legal systems of the Contracting
   States  have  produced  different solutions to  the  problem  which
   arises when the relevant circumstances only become known after  the
   expiry  of  the time-limit. In some States, in certain  exceptional
   cases a court may grant leave to institute proceedings out of  time
   (Rasmussen, cited above, з 24). In others the authority  to  do  so
   is vested in the public prosecutor (see Yildirim, cited above).
       43.  In the applicant's case, the power of appreciation of  the
   domestic  courts  was  circumscribed by Article  49  of  the  RSFSR
   Marriage  and Family Code. That provision was capable of adequately
   securing the interests of a husband who, on learning of a  fact  or
   date  of  birth  that suggested that the child was not  his,  could
   make an informed choice and either accept the legal presumption  of
   paternity  or  challenge it in the courts.  It  made,  however,  no
   allowance  for husbands in the applicant's situation  who  did  not
   become  aware  of  the biological reality until more  than  a  year
   after  the registration of the birth. The Government did  not  give
   any  reasons  why  it should have been "necessary in  a  democratic
   society"  to  establish an inflexible time-limit with time  running
   irrespective   of   the   putative  father's   awareness   of   the
   circumstances casting doubt on his paternity and not  to  make  any
   exceptions to the application of that time-limit.
       44. According to the Court's case-law, the situation in which a
   legal  presumption is allowed to prevail over biological and social
   reality,  without regard to both established facts and  the  wishes
   of  those concerned and without actually benefiting anyone, is  not
   compatible,  even having regard to the margin of appreciation  left
   to  the  State,  with the obligation to secure effective  "respect"
   for private and family life (Kroon, cited above, з 40).
       45.  The  Court considers that the fact that the applicant  was
   prevented  from disclaiming paternity because he did  not  discover
   that  he  might not be the father until more than a year  after  he
   learnt  of  the registration of the birth was not proportionate  to
   the  legitimate  aims pursued. It follows that a fair  balance  has
   not  been struck between the general interest of the protection  of
   legal  certainty of family relationships and the applicant's  right
   to  have  the  legal presumption of his paternity reviewed  in  the
   light of the biological evidence.
       46.   The   Court  concludes  that,  despite  the   margin   of
   appreciation  afforded to the respondent State, it  has  failed  to
   secure to the applicant the respect for his private life, to  which
   he is entitled under the Convention.
       There  has  therefore  been a violation of  Article  8  of  the
   Convention.
                                   
            II. Application of Article 41 of the Convention
                                   
       47. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
       "If  the  Court  finds that there has been a violation  of  the
   Convention  or  the Protocols thereto, and if the internal  law  of
   the   High   Contracting  Party  concerned  allows   only   partial
   reparation  to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford  just
   satisfaction to the injured party."
                                   
                               A. Damage
                                   
                        1. Non-pecuniary damage
                                   
       48. The applicant claimed 8,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for
   non-pecuniary  damage.  He  submitted that  the  rejection  of  his
   action  to contest paternity had caused him pain and suffering.  He
   referred  to  comparable awards in the cases of  McMichael  v.  the
   United  Kingdom (judgment of 24 February 1995, Series A No.  307-B,
   з  103),  Amuur v. France (judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports  1996-
   III,  з  36), and Nsona v. the Netherlands (judgment of 28 November
   1996, Reports 1996-V, з 106).
       49.  The Government considered that the claim was excessive and
   unreasonable and that a mere finding of a violation would suffice.
       50. The Court accepts that the applicant has suffered damage of
   a  non-pecuniary  nature  as a result of  the  State's  failure  to
   comply  with  its  positive obligations relating to  the  right  to
   respect  for  his private life. The Court considers that  the  non-
   pecuniary  damage  sustained by the applicant is  not  sufficiently
   compensated  for  by the finding of a violation of the  Convention.
   Making  an  assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards  the
   applicant  EUR 6,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable  on  that
   amount.
                                   
                          2. Pecuniary damage
                                   
       51.  The  applicant sought an exemption from his obligation  to
   pay  child  maintenance and reimbursement of  the  amounts  he  had
   already paid.
       52.  The Government contested this claim, arguing that  it  was
   not supported by appropriate evidence.
       53.  As regards the applicant's claim for injunctive relief  in
   respect  of  the  payment of maintenance for the child,  the  Court
   reiterates  that  its  judgments  are  essentially  declaratory  in
   nature  and  that,  in  general, it  is  primarily  for  the  State
   concerned  to  choose the means to be used in  its  domestic  legal
   order  in order to discharge its legal obligation under Article  46
   of  the  Convention, provided that such means are  compatible  with
   the  conclusions set out in the Court's judgment (see Assanidze  v.
   Georgia  [GC],  No.  71503/01, з 202, ECHR 2004-...,  with  further
   references).  The  Court is not empowered under the  Convention  to
   grant  exemptions  or  declarations  of  the  kind  sought  by  the
   applicant  (see  Dudgeon  v.  the  United  Kingdom  (Article   50),
   judgment  of  24  February 1983, Series A No. 59, з 15;  McMichael,
   cited  above,  з 105; Couez v. France, judgment of 24 August  1998,
   Reports 1998-V, зз 32 - 36).
       54.  As regards the applicant's claim for the reimbursement  of
   maintenance  payments, the Court notes that the applicant  did  not
   indicate  the  amounts that had already been paid  or  provide  any
   documents in support of his claim. Accordingly, it makes  no  award
   under this head.
                                   
                         B. Costs and expenses
                                   
       55.  Relying on documentary evidence, the applicant claimed EUR
   1,888.48, less the amount he had received in legal aid, in  respect
   of  the proceedings before the Court, comprising his lawyer's fees,
   postage  and  copying  costs and value-added tax.  He  claimed  EUR
   2,116.60  for  legal and experts' fees and travel expenses  in  the
   domestic proceedings. Finally, he claimed EUR 223.43 for the  costs
   of translation of the domestic judgments.
       56.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not  shown
   that  he  had  paid  Mr  Rixe's  bill.  They  also  considered   it
   inappropriate  to  include the value-added tax  because,  in  their
   view,  it would mean that the Russian authorities were contributing
   to the German treasury.
       57.  The  Court reiterates that it will award legal  costs  and
   expenses  only  if  satisfied that these were necessarily  incurred
   and  reasonable as to quantum. It notes that the costs and expenses
   claimed  by  the  applicant were supported by appropriate  evidence
   and   did  not  appear  disproportionate  to  the  amount  of  work
   performed  in  the  case. However, a certain  reduction  is  to  be
   applied  as  some  of  the  applicant's  complaints  were  declared
   inadmissible.  Making its assessment on the basis of the  available
   information, the Court awards the applicant EUR 4,000 less EUR  701
   received  by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe, plus  any
   tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
                                   
                          C. Default interest
                                   
       58.  The  Court  considers  it  appropriate  that  the  default
   interest  should  be  based on the marginal  lending  rate  of  the
   European  Central  Bank, to which should be added three  percentage
   points.
                                   
               FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
                                   
       1.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8  of  the
   Convention;
       2. Holds
       (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,  within
   three  months from the date on which the judgment becomes final  in
   accordance  with  Article 44 з 2 of the Convention,  the  following
   amounts:
       (i)  EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
   damage;
       (ii)  EUR  3,299  (three thousand two hundred  and  ninety-nine
   euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
       (iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
       (b)  that  from the expiry of the above-mentioned three  months
   until  settlement  simple interest shall be payable  on  the  above
   amounts  at  a  rate  equal to the marginal  lending  rate  of  the
   European  Central  Bank  during  the  default  period  plus   three
   percentage points;
       3.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim  for  just
   satisfaction.
   
       Done  in English, and notified in writing on 24 November  2005,
   pursuant to Rule 77 з 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
   
                                                      Christos ROZAKIS
                                                             President
                                                                      
                                                       {Soren} NIELSEN
                                                             Registrar
   
   
   
   
   
       In accordance with Article 45 з 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
   з  2  of  the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Mr Lorenzen
   is annexed to this judgment.
   
                                                                  C.L.
                                                                      
                                                                  S.N.
                                   
                 CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LORENZEN
                                   
       I have agreed with the majority that there has been a violation
   of  Article  8  but  only with some hesitation  for  the  following
   reasons:
       The  assessment of to what extent and under what  conditions  a
   registered  paternity may be contested is very difficult  involving
   a  number  of conflicting interests. Thus the "biological  reality"
   is  only  one of them, and it may in the circumstances of  a  given
   case be outweighed by for instance the interests of the child,  the
   child's  mother or the society in preserving the stability  of  the
   legal  status  of  persons.  An example  of  that  is  the  Court's
   decision  of  19  October  1999  in  Yildirim  v.  Austria.  It  is
   therefore not astonishing that a survey of the legislations in  the
   Contracting States on the institution of paternity actions  reveals
   that  there is no universally adopted standard, but on the contrary
   the  various  legal systems differ considerably  according  to  the
   political, social and cultural traditions. In my opinion the  Court
   should  be  careful  not to impose a general opinion  on  how  such
   conflicting  interests should be assessed but leave a  wide  margin
   of appreciation to national legislators.
       The   former  Russian  legislation  only  made  a  contestation
   possible  until one year after the birth of the child  irrespective
   of  the circumstances of the case. Even if such a limited access to
   contest  a  paternity  is  not unique in the  legislations  of  the
   Contracting  States,  it must nevertheless be  justified.  However,
   the  respondent Government have not advanced any arguments in  that
   respect,  and  for  that reason I can agree to  the  finding  of  a
   violation in the present case.
   
   

<<< Назад

 
Реклама

Новости


Реклама

Новости сайта Тюрьма


Hosted by uCoz